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The European Union’s response to the financial crisis as
regards credit ratings and rating agencies should be
grounded in a proper identification of the underlying prob-
lem. These agencies make an easy target for scapegoating,
even if their responsibility is smaller than that of some
other market participants. That said, rating agencies have
failed the marketplace in the run-up to the crisis, as their
risk assessment processes have been found wanting on a
number of counts. However, it is not clear that conflicts of
interests have been the root cause of this serious failure,
even if such conflicts may have existed. Thus, legislation
eliminating conflicts of interests (supposing such a thing
were possible) would probably not address what really went
wrong, and may in addition have harmful unintended
consequences. This is a complex policy issue for which
there exists no simple, quick fix.
Fair competition in financial risk assessment services
The real problem, running deeper than the possibility of
conflicts of interests, is that our system of financial risk
assessment is broken. Investors, regulators and other mar-
ket participants now realise that the information basis on
which they have been used to considering financial risk,
consisting in large part of credit ratings, has been
insufficient and, to a certain extent, distorting. What we
need are whole new forms of intermediation of the
information about financial risk. However, while the need
for new types of financial risk assessment services is
increasingly obvious, it is not yet clear what exactly they
will be. Public policy should maximise the chances of such
new services emerging quickly through fair competition
among risk assessment firms, rating agencies or other-
wise, an environment where rating agencies will not neces-
sarily prevail and in which they should not be given any
unfair advantage in view of their recent failings. One crucial
aspect is that rating agencies should no longer be granted
the information privilege they currently enjoy compared
with other market participants whose business is partly or
mainly to assess financial risk.
Avoid unintended consequences
Beyond this crucial point and in view of existing proposals,
the European Union should be mindful of the ‘primum non
nocere’ principle and make sure that its legislative initia-
tives do not make the situation worse than it currently is.
This principally applies to three dimensions:
• The new legislation should not result in decreased com-
petition on the market for credit ratings, entrenching of
the current oligopoly and raising barriers to new
entrants. 
• The new legislation should not result in reduced indepen-
dence of the rating agencies, through mechanisms that
would allow political authorities to exert direct or indirect
discretionary pressure on agencies to modify their
ratings. 
• The new legislation should not result in fragmentation of
the global and European financial space, at the risk of
making all economic actors poorer. The openness of the
financial system is a global public good whose integrity
is not guaranteed in the current environment, and which
policymakers must strive to preserve.
1. Research fellow at Bruegel, financial expert to the ECON Committee (+32 473 815372/n.veron@bruegel.org). This briefing paper was prepared for
the European Parliament. Copyright remains with the European Parliament at all times.2
1 A BROKEN SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL RISK REPORTING
Rating agencies have played a central role in the way
financial risk has been assessed by market participants in
the recent past. However, a combination of flawed use of
ratings and shortcomings in the ratings themselves has led
to a situation in which our system of financial risk assess-
ment is unsuited to the needs of the marketplace. 
The central role of rating agencies
For corporate and state issuers, much information about
financial risk is in the public domain, including for listed cor-
porate issuers in the disclosure notes to audited financial
statements. Public information helps market participants
form opinions about financial risk. However, a number of
factors have conspired to give credit ratings a central role in
the formation of judgments about risk, including that:
• Rating agencies play a useful role in mutualising the
effort to analyse information, a costly process that most
participants, even those who have their own credit
research teams, cannot afford individually; 
• Rating agencies have a unique historical
perspective, experience, and proprietary
databases of past credit behaviour of a
large number of issuers; 
• Rating agencies have access to some non-
public information, typically on business
prospects and financial planning in the case of corporate
ratings, and on underlying assets in the case of asset-
backed securities; 
• Rating agencies are granted reference status both by
widespread market practice and by public regulation,
including (but not only) by the Basel 2 framework for
banking supervision.
The centrality of rating agencies to market participants’
financial risk assessment helps explain both the high
degree of concentration of the market for rating services,
and the observed high level of profitability of the three lead-
ing agencies. Moody’s, the only large rating agency to be a
stand-alone listed company, achieved the highest profit
margins of all the companies in the S&P500 index for five
years running in the early 2000s
2. In part because market
participants display an apparent preference for the simplic-
ity of having to analyse only a limited number of ratings, the
rating business has developed into a ‘natural oligopoly’: new
entrants have tended either to be absorbed by one of the
three most established firms, or to remain relatively
marginal or specialised players. The author is not aware of
any evidence of anti-competitive behaviour by the leading
rating agencies to prevent new entrants from penetrating
their market.
Rating agencies have come under repeated criticism, either
for their delay in modifying ratings in view of market devel-
opments, or for the abruptness of unexpected downgrades.
A stream of academic studies suggests that ratings have lit-
tle or no informational value added compared to market sig-
nals
3, and some observers have suggested that market indi-
cators could advantageously replace the agencies’ rating.
However, there seems to be a strong consensus among
market participants that rating agencies, for all their
failings, serve a useful purpose. 
Misjudgments by investors and regulators
The current crisis has exposed a number of misjudgments
and policy mistakes made by a variety of market
participants as regards credit ratings, including flawed
investment policies and the creation of perverse incentives.
Until August 2007, many participants in cap-
ital markets operated on the implicit under-
standing that credit ratings could provide the
basis for their assessment of financial risk.
Many investors, especially in fixed-income
securities, made investment decisions main-
ly, even in certain cases solely, on the basis of the credit
rating of the corresponding instruments. Such investment
behaviour was plainly misguided. The distribution of risk is
not identical for all issuers or securities, and this should
have an impact on investment strategies beyond the mere
consideration of a probability of default.
Beyond investors, a variety of market participants, both
public and private, have assigned ratings a key role.
Especially prudential regulators have automatically linked
certain capital calculations under the Basel 2 framework for
banking supervision to the credit rating of the correspond-
ing instruments. Prudential rules have restricted the invest-
ment options of regulated players, including financial firms
or investment funds, on the basis of credit ratings. In the
private sector, some investment vehicles have similarly
been restricted by contract to invest only in certain instru-
ments on the basis of ratings, and rating ‘triggers’ have
been inserted into loan agreements, thus ensuring that
rating changes would automatically bear economic
consequences.
2. Sam Jones, ‘How Moody’s faltered’, Financial Times / FT Weekend, 17 October 2008.
3. See Richard Levich, Giovanni Majnoni and Carmen Reinhart (eds.), Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System, Kluwer, 2002.
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With hindsight, it seems odd that such an important role
has been assigned to what the rating agencies themselves
generally present as mere opinions, provided by firms
which do not bear any significant liability for their misjudg-
ments (although the jurisprudence is still underdeveloped,
and situations may vary from one jurisdiction to another on
this count). An obvious comparison is the media, which also
expresses opinions on the assessment of a wide
range of risks, including financial ones, and is sub-
ject to the same freedom and liability regime as
rating agencies. While the media plays an impor-
tant role in financial markets, no one would consid-
er advocating that regulations or contractual
clauses, such as those mentioned above, be based on the
content of newspapers’ editorials. 
Rating agencies have failed the marketplace
However, some failings revealed by the current crisis are
attributable to the rating agencies themselves. Specifically,
they have failed to assess correctly the risk associated with
a wide range of structured products backed by real-estate
assets, most notoriously subprime mortgages in the US. The
downgrading of a number of such products, which started
too late in July 2007
4, was a key trigger of the beginning of
the crisis when, as a consequence, ‘investors lost confi-
dence in the ratings of a wider range of structured assets’
5.
Unlike with equity analysts at the time of the internet bub-
ble, no clear evidence has surfaced at this stage of conduct
by the rating agencies that could unambiguously be charac-
terised as a material breach of existing laws or regulations.
However, there is increasing evidence of the agencies hav-
ing been overstretched during the securitisation boom of
the mid-2000s. Probably the clearest evidence so far is the
report published on 8 July 2008 by the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). A typical statement quoted in
this report from an email sent in February 2007 by a senior
analytical manager at one of the leading rating agencies
states: ‘We do not have the resources to support what we
are doing now’
6. This is particularly damning as the sub-
prime segment, in contrast to other segments of the US real-
estate market, did not rely on long historical data series,
with the consequence that the in-depth analysis of each
transaction and of the broader economic context should
have been given especially high priority. Indeed, when the
subprime downturn materialised in 2007, it was more
abrupt, and revealed a different pattern of correlations from
earlier housing downturns.
The picture that emerges is one in which the rating agencies
were ready to compromise the quality of their processes in
order to grab or defend market share in a booming environ-
ment, with the volumes and complexity of securitisation
sharply on the rise in the years to 2007. Diligence has been
deficient both at a ‘micro’ level, with not enough in-depth
analysis of the assets underlying specific securities and/or
the related risks, and at the ‘macro’
level. On the latter point specifically,
insufficient market research (or
insufficient attention given to it) could
be one of the reasons for the agencies’
failure to anticipate the major downturn
in the US housing market in time and to revise their risk
assessments accordingly.
The agencies’ desire to maintain their high profitability
levels may have played a role in these failings, which could
otherwise have been at least partly addressed by adequate
recruitment.
Conflicts of interest in the rating agencies’ relationships
with their clients may have aggravated the situation.
Structured products inherently present more scope for such
conflicts than traditional corporate ratings, in part because
of the relatively small number of securitisation arrangers,
mainly leading investment banks, compared to the
relatively large number of rated corporates, which means
that rating agencies are not crucially dependent on any
individual corporate client. However, available evidence sug-
gests that agencies may have failed even in cases where
such conflicts were absent or immaterial.
This underallocation of resources and lack of sufficient mar-
ket analysis is most obvious in the rating of subprime secu-
rities and a range of other structured products, mainly in
the US. In contrast, rating processes appear to have
remained of high quality in many mature segments, includ-
ing prime residential mortgage-backed securities and other
asset-backed securities. However, with hindsight the
failings in relation to subprime and other products have had
at least an indirect effect on the reliability of other ratings
as well, most obviously those of financial firms which were
negatively impacted by subprime-related downgrades. AIG,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were given a high ‘triple A’
rating by the leading agencies until a fairly short period
before their downfall.
It is difficult to assess how existing regulatory regimes
4. Gretchen Morgenson, ‘Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?’, The New York Times, 7 December 2008.
5. Financial Stability Forum, ‘Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience’, 7 April 2008.
6. US Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating
Agencies’, July 2008.
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have influenced the extent of the shortcomings in rating
processes. Structured products are significantly more
developed in the US than in Europe, in terms of both volume
and complexity. It is therefore unsurprising that most
problematic evidence comes from the US, which does not
necessarily mean that rating practice in Europe has gener-
ally met higher standards.
One can also observe that the fact that ratings in the US
have been subject to a formal regulatory regime since
1975, strengthened by the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006, while no comparable regulation yet exists in
Europe, does not appear to have made a material difference.
Admittedly, implementation of the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act was too recent at the time the crisis erupted for
a full impact assessment of that legislation. 
The current financial risk assessment system is
insufficient
The failings of the leading rating agencies leave the market-
place in a quandary. While it is easy to see that ratings have
gained too much importance and trust in the last few years,
it is not easy at all to see what might now take their place. 
Market measures of some risks, such as those provided by
the price of credit-default swaps, have developed signifi-
cantly over the past decade. But they are inherently very
volatile, subject to market manipulation, and not necessar-
ily available for all rated instruments. Thus, in spite of their
usefulness, they do not fulfil the marketplace’s need for
financial risk information and analysis.
Financial risk information is inherently multidimensional,
difficult to standardise and hard to anal-
yse. Financial statements and accounting
have historically been developed chiefly
to serve the information needs of share-
holders, who are also accorded privileged
status in the conceptual framework that
currently underlies the setting of International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS)
7. While an ongoing discussion
to amend this framework would place creditors alongside
shareholders as primary constituents of IFRS standards-
setting, it is likely that financial statements and their disclo-
sure notes will remain an inadequate source of information
for some aspects of financial risk assessment in the fore-
seeable future.
In any case, current levels of risk disclosure can hardly be
considered satisfactory. A study by the Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) indicates that
‘enhanced disclosure and standardisation of information’
comes first among the concerns of polled market
participants
8.
Moreover, disclosure is not the only, or perhaps even the
main, aspect of a discussion about the requirements of
financial risk assessment. Analysing the available
information can take considerable time and resources,
which, as mentioned, is one of the reasons for credit rating
agencies’ historic success. The current realisation that
credit ratings do not carry sufficient informational content
to guide investment decisions, and that they are not as reli-
able as had been widely assumed before, creates a demand
for new forms of financial risk assessment, a ‘risk
information gap’ which is not currently being plugged. This
gap is made larger by financial innovation and is especially
acute for new, comparatively untested market segments for
which no long historical data series exist, as was the case
with the subprime housing market. 
2 HOW TO FIX IT: FAVOUR THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
FINANCIAL RISK ASSESSMENT SERVICES
In order to ensure the proper functioning of credit markets,
and especially of markets for fixed-income securities, pub-
lic policy should aim to close the ‘risk information gap’ iden-
tified in the previous section.
A comparable information gap was bridged exactly a centu-
ry ago, in 1909, when the first credit ratings were published
in New York. This was a period of tremendous
regulatory upheaval (the US Federal Reserve
system was created by legislation passed in
1913, following a major banking crisis in 1907),
but the response came at the time through the
entrepreneurial initiative of John Moody, a
financial journalist by background, whose name one of the
leading rating agencies still carries.
Today’s challenge is similar. Decentralised innovation is
more likely than regulatory initiatives to invent the new
forms of information intermediation that are needed to
overcome the shortcomings of credit ratings. In other
words, we need a John Moody for the twenty-first century,
and she is more likely to be a private entrepreneur than a
7. International Accounting Standards Board, Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements, 1989. Freely downloadable in
European Commission, ‘Comments concerning certain Articles of the Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards and the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 and the
Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 on accounting’, November 2003.
8. SIFMA/ESF/ASF/AusSF report, ‘Restoring Confidence in the Securitisation Markets’, December 2008.
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public official. As economists David Smick and Adam Posen
put it, ‘no one suggests that a central institution would def-
initely tell one the worth of a stock, especially under chang-
ing circumstances. So why should that be true for a fixed-
income security? [...] Our financial system is a highly
adaptable organism forever evolving. Disenfranchise the
ratings dinosaurs and the broader system will produce a
myriad of small, more agile, more inventive private risk
assessment investor services’
9.
The same argument goes against the idea suggested by
some of transforming the rating agencies into a public
monopoly. While there should be no objection to state-con-
trolled rating agencies competing for financial risk assess-
ment services (in compliance with the EU competition poli-
cy, which does not discriminate against state-controlled
entities), introducing a monopoly, public or otherwise,
would be counterproductive. Ratings are opinions about
risks, and a diversity of opinions will always serve the mar-
ketplace better than one single source. Some commenta-
tors have used an analogy with public agencies that vet the
safety of foods or drugs
10; but if such an analogy is to be
pursued, it is about the regulation of financial products,
which is a different matter from their credit rating.
Among new risk assessment business propositions that
may emerge or expand in the next few years, some may
focus on the risk of default, as do credit rating agencies, and
others on other dimensions of risk; some may make their
assessments public, others may reserve them for their
clients or, in the case of buy-side credit research, for propri-
etary investment purposes; some may be paid by investors,
others by issuers, or by other market participants.
Rather than trying to impose a single model for the assess-
ment of intrinsically multidimensional financial risk, public
policy should mandate and enforce an adequate level and
quality of disclosure, which is something only public author-
ities can do. Moreover, public policy should be designed to
ensure that the rating agencies’ current dominant position
in the market for financial risk assessment does not pre-
vent new and better risk assessment service providers from
emerging through fair competition.
In practical terms, this means at least two things: fair com-
petition among risk assessment methods; and equal
access to information. The first requirement would lead to
the elimination of specific references to credit ratings in
public regulations. The second requirement would lead to
the removal of rating agencies’ current information
privilege, which has ceased to be justified by the quality of
their service to the marketplace.
Fair competition among risk assessment methods
The specific reference by prudential rules and other regula-
tions to credit ratings, mentioned in the previous section,
started as far back as the 1930s in the US
11. But it has been
much reinforced by more recent developments, including
the extensive role assigned to ratings in the Basel 2 frame-
work for banking supervision. The rating agencies them-
selves cannot be faulted for such developments, which they
even tried to forestall in some instances
12. But, as
expressed in vivid terms by recognised legal scholar Frank
Partnoy, the result has largely been to shift them ‘from pro-
viding information to selling “regulatory licences”, keys that
unlock financial markets’
13. Other public rules that make
specific reference to credit ratings apply to some invest-
ment funds, or to the types of collateral that central banks
may accept in their liquidity operations.
The crisis has made obvious the perverse effects of such
regulatory arrangements. To correct them, regulations
should no longer refer specifically to credit ratings, but more
broadly to appropriate risk assessments. In certain cases,
these could be based on available ratings published by
rating agencies, but the automaticity should be removed.
The gradual elimination of the explicit reference to credit
ratings has already started as a consequence of the crisis,
especially in the US by the SEC, whose chairman has publicly
recognised that ‘[the SEC’s] own rules may be contributing
to an uncritical reliance on rating agencies as a substitute
for independent evaluation’
14, an expression which is itself
directly borrowed from the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)’s
report of 7 April 2008. Other regulators should do likewise,
especially (but not only) in the context of future revisions of
the Basel 2 framework, as has been advocated by, among
others, an eminent group of financial economists
15.
Because credit ratings are useful to issuers independently
of their regulatory impact, they would continue to be avail-
able throughout and beyond the transition to a regulatory
9. David Smick and Adam Posen, ‘Disenfranchise The Ratings Agencies’, The International Economy, Fall 2008.
10.Heiner Flassbeck, ‘They should be taken over by a public regulatory agency’, The International Economy, Fall 2008.
11.Richard Sylla, ‘A Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Ratings’, in Levich, Majnoni & Reinhart, Op. Cit.(see footnote 2).
12.See Daniel Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008, p. 98
13.Frank Partnoy, ‘Do away with rating-based rules’, Financial Times, 8 July 2008.
14.Kate Plourd, ‘SEC: Credit Ratings Are a Crutch’, CFO.com, 26 June 2008.
15.Financial Economists Roundtable, ‘Statement on Reforming the Role of the Statistical Rating Organizations in the Securitization Process’, 1
December 2008; downloadable from: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/FER12%201%2008rev.pdf.6
regime that would not itself make explicit reference to them.
Thus, the suggested regulatory changes would not
adversely impact market developments.
As also called for by the FSF, a parallel effort should be
undertaken by private-sector market participants. For
example, the European asset management industry recent-
ly announced steps to diminish their
reliance on credit ratings
16.
Ending the information privilege: equal
access to information
For alternative forms of financial risk
assessment services to emerge, a level playing field must
imperatively be ensured in terms of access to information.
Otherwise market participants will continue to assign prior-
ity status to credit ratings, if these are assumed to rely on
more complete information than other sources. For ratings
of corporate and financial issuers, this equal access is not
guaranteed under present regulatory arrangements, which
confer a de facto information privilege on rating agencies.
Rating agencies are specifically exempt from some of the
provisions of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in the US
and of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) and its implement-
ing regulations in the EU, enabling them to access privileged
information to an extent other market participants cannot
(with the exception of the financial press). When Reg FD
was adopted by the SEC in 2000, and the MAD by the EU in
2003, the concern was mainly insider trading by analysts
or the financial firms which employ them. In the case of the
risk assessment industry, the problem is not insider trading
per se, but the undue competitive advantage that rating
agencies enjoy through their access to non-public
information
17.
It has sometimes been argued that the extent
of non-public information on which the rating
agencies are reliant for corporate ratings is lim-
ited and does not significantly distort competi-
tion for risk assessment services. If so, the
removal of the agencies’ information privilege
would not have any adverse impact on ratings quality.
However, the agencies themselves have occasionally recog-
nised that such information is important to them. For exam-
ple, in a recent document that discusses the current busi-
ness model of rating agencies, Standard & Poor’s has noted
that ‘rating agencies using the subscription model [in which
users of ratings, rather than issuers, pay for the rating ser-
vice] may have more limited access to issuers, who have no
obligation to inform those agencies of material changes in
their businesses. This type of information can be extremely
helpful when providing forward looking ratings’
18.
The rating agencies’ information privilege may have been
justified in the past by the perceived collective
value of the services they delivered to the entire
marketplace. In view of their recent failings, how-
ever, this privilege has become indefensible and
should be taken away. Specifically, new regula-
tions should ensure that any material information
provided by issuers to the rating agencies should
be made available to the entire marketplace through public
disclosure. This could be done by removing the exemptions
granted to the rating agencies in Reg FD and the MAD.
As issuers would be unwilling to suffer less favourable
ratings based on limited information, they would have a
strong incentive publicly to disclose key information which
they earlier reserved to the rating agencies, to the benefit of
the entire marketplace. Moreover, the spread of information
technology makes broad disclosure much easier technical-
ly than was the case in the past. Thus, the removal of the
agencies’ information privilege is unlikely to lead to a
decrease in the quality of ratings due to missing
information, either on a temporary or a permanent basis.
Such a change is most obvious in the case of listed corpo-
rate issuers, which already disclose significant financial
information. It could also be envisaged for unlisted corpo-
rate issuers, perhaps at a later stage. From this standpoint,
the rules currently proposed by the SEC, which would force
rating agencies to share such information with other rating
agencies requesting it, may not go far enough
19. In struc-
tured products as well, public disclosure
should be vastly improved and har-
monised at international level; some
progress on this latter aspect may
result from ongoing industry initiatives.
New forms of competition in credit ratings and financial risk
assessment are already emerging. A number of specialised
risk consultancies have prospered in the last few years,
even though the current difficulties of hedge funds and of
the asset management industry may make their economic
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16.European Federation of Asset Management Associations (EFAMA), European Securitisation Forum (ESF), UK Investment Management Association
(IMA), ‘Asset Management Industry Guidelines to Address Over-Reliance Upon Ratings’, 11 December 2008.
17.See François Meunier, ‘Faut-il que les agences de notation soient « initiées » ?’, Risques/Les cahiers de l’assuranceNo.61, March 2005.
18.Standard & Poor’s, ‘Guide to Credit Rating Essentials’, 2008 (available on www.AboutCreditRatings.com).
19.‘Fact Sheet – Open Meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’, 3 December 2008, on www.sec.gov.7
France-based credit insurer, has announced the launch of a
new rating practice, based on quantitative statistical
analysi
20. At the other end of the methodological spectrum,
Kroll, the business intelligence services group, is eyeing the
creation of a rating service focusing on complicated
financial products
21. But not all such risk assessment
providers need be rating agencies in the regulatory sense –
with Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation
(NRSRO) status in the US, or the equivalent future EU
regime – as some of them may focus on other dimensions
of risk, such as stress-testing in extreme scenarios, or
assessment of the quality of issuers’ risk management.
New entrants are unlikely to realise their full potential as
long as they are hampered by regulatory barriers or distor-
tions. Conversely, a multiplicity of new models and methods
for risk assessment could significantly contribute to
financial stability.
3 THE CURRENT DRAFT REGULATION: AVOID UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
The thrust of the proposals presented above – removing ref-
erences to ratings in public regulations, and ensuring that
all providers of financial risk assessment services have
equal access to information – does not put emphasis on
regulating the rating agencies. Nor is such regulation even
necessary from that perspective. The regulatory framework
that has existed since 1975 in the US, reinforced by the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, has not prevented
the agencies’ most visible failings so far from occurring
there rather than in ‘unregulated’ Europe. As Annette
Nazareth, then a (Democratic) Commissioner of the SEC
noted of some observers in 2007, ‘They wish government
edict would make the credit rating agencies smarter and
faster. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act does not
address that nor should it’
22.
A new European framework to regulate rating agencies can
bring welcome improvements. This may include higher
requirements for internal documentation of ratings and for
disclosure of past ratings’ performance over time, as well as
stronger limitations on consulting or quasi-consulting activ-
ities which may create conflicts of interest with the core
ratings business. In fact, many such benefits are already
provided by the regulation of rating agencies by the SEC,
which has a de facto extraterritorial effect and is likely to be
significantly reinforced in the near future.
However, regulating rating agencies in the EU also responds
to a perceived political necessity. The trick here will be to
avoid unintended consequences while responding to this
political pressure. Three main areas of concern are identi-
fied here and dealt with in summary fashion, as these top-
ics have already been the matter of many contributions to
the European policy debate, especially with regard to the
European Commission’s proposal for a regulation on credit
rating agencies published on 12 November 2008.
Competition concerns
Regulation tends to impose one single model of organisa-
tion and activity modeled on existing examples, and thus
may restrict the scope for new entrants on the risk assess-
ment market by limiting the possibility of building a com-
petitive edge through innovative and differentiating fea-
tures. Moreover, regulation may introduce significant com-
pliance costs, which favours large established players over
new and smaller ones. Finally, a vast empirical literature
tends to suggest that, in regulated industries, incumbent
players tend partly to capture the regulator to their own
advantage and to the detriment of potential new entrants,
and there is no reason to believe that rating agencies would
be any different.
Independence concerns
Regulation would empower national authorities to impose
sanctions or otherwise exert coercive powers on the rating
agencies, in some scenarios with a significant degree of
discretionary power. Simultaneously, the same national
authorities issue debt which is rated, and so do national
agencies, local authorities, and state-controlled enterpris-
es. It is not impossible to imagine situations in which the
newly created regulatory power would be leveraged by
national governments in order to exert pressure on ratings
agencies to obtain more favorable ratings for such entities
or for otherwise favoured ‘national champions’ in the private
sector. Thus, regulation could play against, not in favour of,
the quality of credit ratings.
This potentially harmful effect is larger if governments are
granted more discretion when applying sanctions, and
smaller if sanctions are triggered by objective factors (such
as failure to disclose a defined set of data) on which govern-
ments have little margin for arbitrary application. Also, it
would be much reduced if the power to apply sanctions
were given to an EU-level regulatory body rather than to
national ones, as the potential for conflicts of interest would
be significantly reduced.
20.‘Jérôme Cazes (Coface): « Le projet de règlement proposé par Bruxelles ne résout pas les problèmes liés à la crise »’, Les Echos, 8 December 2008.
21.Brooke Masters, ‘Kroll on the trail of a new conquest’, Financial Times, 15 December 2008.
22.Sarah Johnson, ‘How Will the SEC Rate the Rating Agencies ?’, CFO.com, 13 September 2007.8
International fragmentation concerns
Given the global nature of the rating agencies’ activities,
and the obvious need for international consistency of
ratings, there is a significant risk to fragmenting the regula-
tion of rating agencies. From this perspective, a single regu-
lator at European level would have been a more appropriate
response than the rather clumsy, and potentially unstable,
current proposal of ‘colleges’ led by a ‘facilitator’. In practice,
and given the concentration of the leading agencies’
European activities in London, it is likely that the ‘facilitator’
will be the UK Financial Services Authority in most cases,
which will raise issues of political legitimacy in continental
Europe. This echoes the problematic nature of the ‘colleges’
concept more generally
23.
The risk of transatlantic fragmentation as a result of the
new regulation has been widely commented upon. The
23.See Nicolas Véron, ‘Les collèges de superviseurs financiers, vraie ou fausse solution ?’, La Tribune, 26 November 2008; English translation avail-
able on www.bruegel.org.
24.Council of the European Union, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies – Progress report’,
Interinstitutional File 2008/0217 (COD), 16 December 2008.
language of the European Council in December, mentioning
‘the obligation for financial institutions to only use, for reg-
ulatory purposes, credit ratings which are issued by credit
rating agencies registered in the [European] Community,
since it appears the most appropriate solution to ensure a
proper surveillance of these credit rating agencies’
24, raises
significant concerns.
After having rightly lambasted the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 for its extraterritorial effects, Europeans, who like to
pride themselves on their multilateralist ethos, may now
adopt legislation which is even more unilateralist. This is
happening at a moment when international financial inte-
gration appears more at risk than for at least a generation,
with potentially serious consequences for all economies. At
a time of unprecedented need and arguably unprecedented
opportunity for transatlantic and global financial regulatory
initiatives, this would be an ironic development indeed.